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Mexico seemingly thaws out Guillermo Ochoa from his frozen cocoon every four years, reviving an unbeatable colossus between the sticks. Jordan Pickford remembers how to play soccer again as he thrives with a competent defense in front of him. Keylor Navas carries the dreams of an entire rainforested nation on his soldiers — and always comes through.

In the short tournament format, a strong goalkeeper can be the difference between a group-stage exit and a place in the semifinals. With such an emphasis placed on the man between the posts, these are the best goalkeepers at the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar.

Manuel Neuer (Germany), Yassine Bounou (Morocco), André Onana (Cameroon), Édouard Mendy (Senegal), Marc-André ter Stegen (Germany)

Country: Costa Rica

Club: Paris Saint-Germain

The hardest decision with these rankings was who to leave off this list. Yassine Bounou has quietly been one of the best keepers in LaLiga with Sevilla. André Onana is very talented but hasn't played much recently. Manuel Neuer and Édouard Mendy were the most difficult cuts. Neuer has not been the same keeper since his foot injury in 2017-18, while Mendy has been solid for Chelsea but nothing more. Jordan Pickford and Kasper Schmeichel were left off the list due to their EPL struggles over the past few years.

So why does Keylor Navas get the nod here? His 2021-22 campaign was no more impressive than any of the keepers in the honorable mention category, but he has consistently been an above-average shot stopper for Real Madrid and PSG, plus he always seems to find another gear when donning the Costa Rican jersey. Expect more of the same in Qatar.

Country: Portugal

Club: Wolverhampton Wanderers

In terms of pure shot stopping, no EPL keeper had a better year than José Sá in 21-22 — and it wasn't even close. While this showing is a surprise, the bigger shock is that the Wolves keeper has still yet to make his first international appearance for Portugal.

During the past calendar year, Portugal manager Fernando Santos has started Rui Patrício — who has been in decline since Portugal's Euro 2016 title, and Diogo Costa, an unproven 22-year-old who did not become a starter at the club level until the 21-22 season — ahead of José Sá in goal. Even Lyon's Anthony Lopes — one of the best goalkeepers in Ligue 1 — can barely get a game under Fernando Santos. Truly baffling.

If Santos starts anyone other than José Sá between the posts, it could be the costliest decision at the 2022 World Cup.

Country: Poland

Club: Juventus

Remember when Szczęsny was an inconsistent, mistake-prone keeper for Arsenal? His Gunners career seemingly endured forever, but by age 24 he reached a crossroads. Serie A beckoned, and the Polish netminder finally realized his potential, first with Roma and then Juventus — quietly transforming into one of the game's most dependable goalkeepers.

Country: Switzerland

Club: Borussia Mönchengladbach

Sommer is one of those keepers who goes unnoticed until you open up FIFA and realize he is an 85 overall. Followers of international football will know otherwise. The Borussia Mönchengladbach player has been a steady presence during Switzerland's footballing resurgence over the past decade with strong performances at the World Cup and European Championships. This year, his 5.0 goals prevented more than expected ranked in the 88th percentile among Big 5 European keepers, firmly planting Sommer in the top 10 of our rankings.

Country: France

Club: Tottenham Hotspur

At first glance, Hugo Lloris is in decline. His shot-stopping in 21-22 was his worst since FBref started tracking advanced goalkeeper stats in 2017, and his distribution still leaves a lot to be desired. Yet even in a "down" year, Lloris was still an above-average keeper — as he was worth 7.34 expected goals to Spurs in the EPL. Such is the standard set by the Tottenham keeper. Mike Maignan will deservedly get a look in goal, but Hugo Lloris is still a Top 5 keeper in the world.

Country: Brazil

Club: Manchester City

We all know Ederson is one of the best keepers in the world, but the stats show that in recent seasons the Brazilian has not been as good as his reputation has been hyped up to be. Across the Premier League and the Champions League this past season, Ederson allowed 4.7 more goals than expected. His sweeping and distribution are still elite, but he ranked behind Alisson, Lloris, Mendy and even Aaron Ramsdale in terms of overall value in goals for his team.

A keeper cannot be defined by nine months of slightly substandard shot-stopping, but Ederson's performances in the first half of the 22-23 campaign will be something to monitor.

Country: Belgium

Club: Real Madrid

Recency bias may be in play, given that Courtois was an absolute rock for Los Blancos last season, but the Belgian deserves such a favorable ranking. In 13 Champions League matches for Real in 21-22, the Belgian keeper prevented 5.1 more goals than expected — an almost unheard-of rate. He has been equally staunch domestically, allowing 0.71 goals per game in LaLiga over the last three seasons.

Courtois' save against Neymar in 2018 is a moment that will go down in World Cup lore, and the Belgian will add to his international legacy in Qatar.

Country: Brazil

Club: Liverpool

A few years ago, there were multiple keepers in conservation for being the best in the world. Manuel Neuer, Ederson, Allison, Jan Oblak and even Hugo Lloris had legitimate arguments for deserving the top spot. In recent seasons, all five have played very well, but only one has performed at a level worthy of pulling away from the competition: Alisson.

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Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) is a type of attack that occurs when a malicious web site, email, blog, instant message, or program causes a user's web browser to perform an unwanted action on a trusted site when the user is authenticated. A CSRF attack works because browser requests automatically include all cookies including session cookies. Therefore, if the user is authenticated to the site, the site cannot distinguish between legitimate authorized requests and forged authenticated requests. This attack is thwarted when proper Authorization is used, which implies that a challenge-response mechanism is required that verifies the identity and authority of the requester.

The impact of a successful CSRF attack is limited to the capabilities exposed by the vulnerable application and privileges of the user. For example, this attack could result in a transfer of funds, changing a password, or making a purchase with the user's credentials. In effect, CSRF attacks are used by an attacker to make a target system perform a function via the victim's browser, without the victim's knowledge, at least until the unauthorized transaction has been committed.

In short, the following principles should be followed to defend against CSRF:

The synchronizer token pattern is one of the most popular and recommended methods to mitigate CSRF.

Synchronizer token defenses have been built into many frameworks. It is strongly recommended to research if the framework you are using has an option to achieve CSRF protection by default before trying to build your custom token generating system. For example, .NET has built-in protection that adds a token to CSRF vulnerable resources. You are responsible for proper configuration (such as key management and token management) before using these built-in CSRF protections that generate tokens to guard CSRF vulnerable resources.

CSRF tokens should be generated on the server-side. They can be generated once per user session or for each request. Per-request tokens are more secure than per-session tokens as the time range for an attacker to exploit the stolen tokens is minimal. However, this may result in usability concerns. For example, the "Back" button browser capability is often hindered as the previous page may contain a token that is no longer valid. Interaction with this previous page will result in a CSRF false positive security event on the server. In per-session token implementations after the initial generation of a token, the value is stored in the session and is used for each subsequent request until the session expires.

When a request is issued by the client, the server-side component must verify the existence and validity of the token in the request compared to the token found in the user session. If the token was not found within the request, or the value provided does not match the value within the user session, then the request should be rejected. Additional actions such as logging the event as a potential CSRF attack in progress should also be considered.

CSRF tokens should be:

CSRF tokens prevent CSRF because without a token, an attacker cannot create valid requests to the backend server.

For the Synchronised Token Pattern, CSRF tokens should not be transmitted using cookies.

The CSRF token can be transmitted to the client as part of a response payload, such as a HTML or JSON response. It can then be transmitted back to the server as a hidden field on a form submission, or via an AJAX request as a custom header value or part of a JSON payload. Make sure that the token is not leaked in the server logs, or in the URL. CSRF tokens in GET requests are potentially leaked at several locations, such as the browser history, log files, network utilities that log the first line of a HTTP request, and Referer headers if the protected site links to an external site.

For example:

Inserting the CSRF token in the custom HTTP request header via JavaScript is considered more secure than adding the token in the hidden field form parameter because it uses custom request headers.

If maintaining the state for CSRF token on the server is problematic, an alternative defense is to use the double submit cookie technique. This technique is easy to implement and is stateless. In this technique, we send a random value in both a cookie and as a request parameter, with the server verifying if the cookie value and request value match. When a user visits (even before authenticating to prevent login CSRF), the site should generate a (cryptographically strong) pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine separate from the session identifier. The site then requires that every transaction request includes this pseudorandom value as a hidden form value (or as a request parameter/header). If both of them match at server side, the server accepts it as legitimate request and if they don't, it would reject the request.

To enhance the security of this solution include the token in an encrypted cookie - other than the authentication cookie (since they are often shared within subdomains) - and then at the server side match it (after decrypting the encrypted cookie) with the token in hidden form field or parameter/header for AJAX calls. This works because a sub domain has no way to overwrite a properly crafted encrypted cookie without the necessary information such as encryption key.

A simpler alternative to an encrypted cookie is to HMAC the token with a secret key known only by the server and place this value in a cookie. This is similar to an encrypted cookie (both require knowledge only the server holds), but is less computationally intensive than encrypting and decrypting the cookie. Whether encryption or a HMAC is used, an attacker won't be able to recreate the cookie value from the plain token without knowledge of the server secrets.

SameSite is a cookie attribute (similar to HTTPOnly, Secure etc.) which aims to mitigate CSRF attacks. It is defined in RFC6265bis. This attribute helps the browser decide whether to send cookies along with cross-site requests. Possible values for this attribute are Lax, Strict, or None.

The Strict value will prevent the cookie from being sent by the browser to the target site in all cross-site browsing context, even when following a regular link. For example, for a GitHub-like website this would mean that if a logged-in user follows a link to a private GitHub project posted on a corporate discussion forum or email, GitHub will not receive the session cookie and the user will not be able to access the project. A bank website however doesn't want to allow any transactional pages to be linked from external sites, so the Strict flag would be most appropriate.

The default Lax value provides a reasonable balance between security and usability for websites that want to maintain user's logged-in session after the user arrives from an external link. In the above GitHub scenario, the session cookie would be allowed when following a regular link from an external website while blocking it in CSRF-prone request methods such as POST. Only cross-site-requests that are allowed in Lax mode are the ones that have top-level navigations and are also safe HTTP methods.

For more details on the SameSite values, check the following section from the rfc.

Example of cookies using this attribute:

All desktop browsers and almost all mobile browsers now support the SameSite attribute. To keep track of the browsers implementing it and the usage of the attribute, refer to the following service. Note that Chrome has announced that they will mark cookies as SameSite=Lax by default from Chrome 80 (due in February 2020), and Firefox and Edge are both planning to follow suit. Additionally, the Secure flag will be required for cookies that are marked as SameSite=None.

It is important to note that this attribute should be implemented as an additional layer defense in depth concept. This attribute protects the user through the browsers supporting it, and it contains as well 2 ways to bypass it as mentioned in the following section. This attribute should not replace having a CSRF Token. Instead, it should co-exist with that token in order to protect the user in a more robust way.

There are two steps to this mitigation, both of which rely on examining an HTTP request header value.

At server side we verify if both of them match. If they do, we accept the request as legitimate (meaning it's the same origin request) and if they don't, we discard the request (meaning that the request originated from cross-domain). Reliability on these headers comes from the fact that they cannot be altered programmatically as they fall under forbidden headers list, meaning that only the browser can set them.

If the Origin header is present, verify that its value matches the target origin. Unlike the Referer, the Origin header will be present in HTTP requests that originate from an HTTPS URL.

If the Origin header is not present, verify the hostname in the Referer header matches the target origin. This method of CSRF mitigation is also commonly used with unauthenticated requests, such as requests made prior to establishing a session state, which is required to keep track of a synchronization token.

In both cases, make sure the target origin check is strong. For example, if your site is example.org make sure example.org.attacker.com does not pass your origin check (i.e, match through the trailing / after the origin to make sure you are matching against the entire origin).

If neither of these headers are present, you can either accept or block the request. We recommend blocking. Alternatively, you might want to log all such instances, monitor their use cases/behavior, and then start blocking requests only after you get enough confidence.

You might think it's easy to determine the target origin, but it's frequently not. The first thought is to simply grab the target origin (i.e., its hostname and port #) from the URL in the request. However, the application server is frequently sitting behind one or more proxies and the original URL is different from the URL the app server actually receives. If your application server is directly accessed by its users, then using the origin in the URL is fine and you're all set.

If you are behind a proxy, there are a number of options to consider.

This mitigation is working properly when origin or referrer headers are present in the requests. Though these headers are included majority of the time, there are few use cases where they are not included (most of them are for legitimate reasons to safeguard users privacy/to tune to browsers ecosystem). The following lists some use cases:

Usually, a minor percentage of traffic does fall under above categories (1-2%) and no enterprise would want to lose this traffic. One of the popular technique used across the Internet to make this technique more usable is to accept the request if the Origin/referrer matches your configured list of domains "OR" a null value (Examples here. The null value is to cover the edge cases mentioned above where these headers are not sent). Please note that, attackers can exploit this but people prefer to use this technique as a defense in depth measure because of the minor effort involved in deploying it.

Another solution for this problem is use of Cookie Prefixes for cookie with CSRF token. If cookie has __Host- prefix e.g. Set-Cookie: __Host-token=RANDOM; path=/; Secure then the cookie:

As of July 2020 cookie prefixes are supported by all major browsers except Internet Explorer.

See the Mozilla Developer Network and IETF Draft for further information about cookie prefixes.

Adding CSRF tokens, a double submit cookie and value, an encrypted token, or other defense that involves changing the UI can frequently be complex or otherwise problematic. An alternate defense that is particularly well suited for AJAX or API endpoints is the use of a custom request header. This defense relies on the same-origin policy (SOP) restriction that only JavaScript can be used to add a custom header, and only within its origin. By default, browsers do not allow JavaScript to make cross origin requests with custom headers.

If this is the case for your system, you can simply verify the presence of this header and value on all your server side AJAX endpoints in order to protect against CSRF attacks. This approach has the double advantage of usually requiring no UI changes and not introducing any server side state, which is particularly attractive to REST services. You can always add your own custom header and value if that is preferred.

This technique obviously works for AJAX calls, but you still need to protect

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